The Changing Hospital Industry: Comparing For-Profit and Not-for-Profit Institutions by Jonathan S. Skinner & John Wennberg
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Changing Hospital Industry: Comparing For-Profit and
Not-for-Profit Institutions
Volume Author/Editor: David M. Cutler, editor
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-13219-6
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/cutl00-1
Publication Date: January 2000
Chapter Title: How Much Is Enough? Efficiency and Medicare Spending
in the Last Six Months of Life
Chapter Author: Jonathan S. Skinner, John Wennberg
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6763
Chapter pages in book: (p. 169 - 194)How Much Is Enough? 
Efficiency and Medicare Spending 
in the Last Six Months of Life 
Jonathan Skinner and John E. Wennberg 
5.1  Introduction 
Thinking about efficiency in health care is straightforward in theory but 
quite difficult in practice. Health economists have struggled for years to 
measure efficiency in hospital and health care more generally. One branch 
of the literature has concentrated on an objective measure of cost, typi- 
cally the cost of a hospital bed or a hospital bed-day. Thus the question is, 
to what extent is a hospital bed-day produced at minimum cost?' Another 
branch of the literature has addressed a more general question: What is 
the least costly method of improving some dimension of health by a given 
amount?2 We  follow McEachern (1994) in defining this measure of cost 
minimization to be productive eficiency. 
In practice, we  observe widely divergent patterns of care for patients 
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and for populations. For example, the underlying rate of surgery for men 
with enlarged prostates, a benign (noncancerous) condition that interferes 
with urination, varies more than fourfold among geographic regions in the 
United States. Revascularization procedures (bypass surgery and angi- 
oplasty) vary more than threefold (Wennberg and Cooper 1997). The in- 
tensity of care delivered to the seriously ill, measured as the amount of 
care delivered during the last six months of life, varies fivefold. These pat- 
terns raise a question not only about productive efficiency but also about 
allocative efficiency. Even if  surgical procedures for enlarged prostates or 
heart disease are productively efficient, in the sense of minimizing average 
costs, perhaps these procedures are being allocated across regions-and 
people-in  a decidedly inefficient way.3 
In this paper, we consider these issues of productive and allocative eff- 
ciency in health care. We begin by considering Medicare expenditures and 
physician visits in the last six months of life for two communities, Miami 
and Minneapolis. People who are in their last six months of life are gen- 
erally quite sick, regardless of where they live. Thus, we believe that how 
such patients are treated provides a good indicator of the local pattern of 
practice with respect to the chronically ill. And we find substantial differ- 
ences in how people in their last six months of life are treated in the two 
cities. In Minneapolis, the average number of days spent during the last 
six months of life in an intensive care unit (ICU) is 1.3, in Miami, 4.8.  On 
average, Medicare patients in their final six months in Miami can expect 
76 percent more primary care physician visits, and 440  percent more spe- 
cialist visits, than Medicare patients in Minneapolis. In turn, these indica- 
tors of the intensity of care are closely correlated with the overall intensity 
of Medicare spending on the entire elderly population. 
How to interpret such differences? Perhaps people who live in regions 
like Miami that provide more intensive health care to all patients (as well 
as those near death) also experience improved life expectancy. In this case, 
such regions could be productively efficient in the sense of providing better 
quality health care albeit at higher cost. We address this question by con- 
sidering prospective samples of elderly people, and we use our information 
about regional treatment patterns to “mark” individuals in regions where 
aggressive treatment is provided for a12  patients. The question is  then 
whether regions with intensive health care treatment experience reduced 
mortality, after controlling for a variety of age, sex, race, and illness factors 
that might exert independent influences on mortality. Briefly, we  find no 
evidence that improved survival outcomes are associated with increased 
levels of spending. In other words, hospitals may be at the minimum point 
3. Again, we  follow the McEachern (1994, 550) terminology; allocative efficiency is “the 
condition that  exists when  firms  produce  the  output  that  is  most  preferred  by  con- 
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of their long-run average total cost curve in producing hospital bed-days, 
but stray far from a productively efficient level in terms of producing sur- 
vival years. 
While mortality may be the appropriate outcome variable to assess, say, 
the effectiveness of intensive care units, there is more to efficiency than 
life expectancy. Individuals seek to maximize utility, and there are costly 
procedures offering improved health functioning at the cost of increased 
mortality risk. Other expensive procedures may  have no impact on sur- 
vival rates, but do affect different aspects of health status. For example, 
surgical treatment for an enlarged prostate improves urinary flow, but it 
can adversely affect sexual functioning. There is no best treatment for en- 
larged prostates; some men prefer surgical treatment and others prefer 
drug treatment or watchful waiting. Thus, allocative efficiency means that 
the people are treated in the way that they would prefer, generally by being 
able to choose from the menu of productively efficient  procedure^.^ 
It is important to consider preferences for different types of treatment 
because it could be the case that people in Miami prefer the more intensive 
health care services because they prefer such treatment, even if there is no 
measurable difference  in survival. We examine the importance of heteroge- 
neity in preferences in light of the results from recent experiments in in- 
formed patient decision making for patients with enlarged prostates and 
with angina due to coronary artery disease. And while these studies are 
not specific to Miami, they do suggest that while some preferred the more 
intensive treatment options, on average patients preferred rates of surgery 
lower than the level prescribed by most physicians. Thus, the allocative 
costs of increased levels of surgical intervention could be even larger than 
those considered in standard cost-benefit trade-off comparisons. 
5.2  A Look at Miami and Minneapolis 
The hospital referral regions for Miami and Minneapolis include a 
larger area than just the cities themselves. They were determined as part 
of an effort by the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care (Wennberg and Cooper 
1997) to map the entire United States into 306 regions, each of which has 
one or more hospitals offering cardiovascular or neurosurgical services. 
Thus, the Minneapolis hospital referral region (HRR) comprises  zip codes 
whose residents tend to be admitted, or referred to, the major hospitals in 
Minneapolis, even though the actual region extends well beyond the city 
limits (see fig. 5.1)? Individuals (and their utilization records) are allocated 
4. A more difficult question is whether, at the margin, (productive) medical spending is 
worth what must be given up in terms of other nonmedical goods. 
5. The geographical boundaries of the Miami and Minneapolis areas are defined using 
methods in the Dartmouth Atlas of  Health Care (Wennberg and Cooper 1997). In the atlas, 
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Fig. 5.1 
Note:  Because hospitals  in  Miami,  and particularly  Minneapolis,  are  magnets  for  sur- 
rounding areas, the actual HRRs for the two cities are quite a bit larger than the actual city 
boundaries. Note that even if a citizen of Miami, for example, received treatment in Fort 
Lauderdale, the utilization data is counted in Miami. 
The Miami and Minneapolis HRRs 
to Miami or Minneapolis not because they go to those hospitals, but be- 
cause they live in zip codes where (typically) the majority of patients do 
go to such hospitals. 
These two regions have been shown in prior research to have vastly 
different patterns of health care spending on a per capita basis. One prob- 
lem inherent in comparing different regions is that they do in fact differ 
with regard to community-level disease patterns such as acute myocardial 
infarction (AMI) and stroke rates. However, even after correcting for such 
differences, there are still substantial differences in per enrollee rates of 
utilization (Wennberg and Cooper 1997; Skinner and Fisher 1997). For 
example, figure 5.2 summarizes data on differences in all per capita Medi- 
care reimbursements, inpatient services, professional and laboratory ser- 
vices, and home health care (Wennberg and Cooper 1997). As  the left- 
hand panel shows, the two cities are clearly at opposite ends of the spec- 
trum in terms of overall Medicare spending. (Each of the fainter dots in 
hospital (or more than one hospital in the same city or town) that served as a primary source 
of hospital care. The allocation of zip codes was done on the basis of a 100 percent sample 
of Medicare hospital discharges. In total, there were 3,436 HSAs in the United States. How- 
ever, many of these HSAs were small in size, with low-volume local hospitals sending their 
patients to larger hospitals for complicated procedures. The atlas therefore allocated each of 
these HSAs to a hospital referral region (HRR); each HRR has at least one hospital that 
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Fig. 5.2  Medicare reimbursements per enrollee, Miami and Minneapolis 
Note: The left-hand panel gives  the age, sex, race, price, and illness adjusted per person 
spending by  the Medicare program in 1995 for the 306 hospital referral regions studied in 
the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care. Spending varies nearly threefold from the lowest to the 
highest region. Total spending for residents of Miami is 2.1 times greater than Minneapolis 
on a per person basis. Inpatient reimbursements  are 52 percent higher; those for professional 
and laboratory services are more than 3.2 times greater; home health spending is more than 
four times greater. 
the diagram represents one of the other 306 hospital referral regions in the 
United States.) 
In the right-hand panel, the height of the bars shows the ratio of price- 
illness-age-sex-race-adjusted levels of  services to the United  States. In 
Minneapolis, home health services are 39 percent of the national average, 
while in Miami they are 60 percent above average, meaning their ratio is 
roughly 4  to 1. By contrast, the ratio between Miami and Minneapolis for 
inpatient services is just 1.5 to 1, suggesting that services with the greatest 
discretionary (and profitability) component-home  health and laboratory 
services-are  the ones most sensitive to geographic location. 
A different way of comparing spending is to look at expenditures and 
utilization during the last six months of life, a period of  time when many 
Medicare enrollees are  quite ill.  Comparing  spending in  the  last  six 
months of life is useful for three reasons. First, it is more difficult to invoke 










the basis of difference in level of illness. Second, this spending has been 
shown elsewhere to account for a large fraction of total Medicare spend- 
ing; thus, how people are treated near death has an important impact on 
the overall Medicare budget (Lubitz and Prihoda 1984). And third, spend- 
ing levels among this group are probably particularly good markers of 
how intensely a region’s medical system treats the very sickest, reflecting 
a sometimes unstated concern that too much is done for people who are 
going to die anyway. 
Figure 5.3 shows that the Miami and Minneapolis regions are again 
at the opposite ends of the national distribution in the intensity of care 
during the last six months of life. Inpatient Medicare expenditures differ 
by about 2 to 1 ($14,212 in Miami versus $7,246 in Minneapolis), with an 
even greater divergence in the average number of ICU days per person in 
their last six months of life (the right-hand panel). 
These are indicators of inpatient hospital use. A more telling compari- 
son is the average number of physician visits billed to Medicare for those 
in their last six months of life. In Miami, the number of primary physician 
visits is certainly higher, 12.5 visits versus 7.1 visits, or a difference of 76 
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Fig. 5.3  Intensity of care in the last six months of life in Miami and Minneapolis 
Note: Miami is the higher dot; Minneapolis is the lower dot. Among the regions, reimburse- 
ments for inpatient care varied more than 2.8-fold, from $5,831 to $16,571. Reimbursements 
for residents of Miami are about two times greater than Minneapolis (lefi-handpanel).  The 
percentage of enrollees spending one or more days in intensive care varied from a low of 
about 9 percent to more than 45 percent. Miami is 2.1 times greater than Minneapolis (center 
panel).  The numbers of days spent in intensive care varied more than ninefold. Miami enroll- 
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Fig. 5.4  Average number of primary and specialist visits (per patient) in the last 
six months of life, Minneapolis and Miami 
Note: The average number of primary care physician visits is higher in Miami than in Minne- 
apolis (12.5 visits versus 7.1), a difference of  76 percent. The average number of specialist 
visits is substantially higher in Miami (25.4 risits versus 4.7), a difference of 440 percent. 
Note that these averages are for the non-HMO population only, and a larger fraction of 
Miami residents are in HMOs. 
most apparent in the average number of specialist visits during the last six 
months of life: 25.4 in Miami versus 4.7 in Minneapolis, a nearly fivefold 
difference. Some of this difference could be explained by the greater HMO 
penetration in Miami, meaning those people who remain in our Medicare 
claims data (the fee-for-service patients) are sicker. But even if we include 
the HMO patients in the denominator, thereby assuming they experience 
no visits to the doctor, the ratio of specialists visits in the region is still 
about 3 to 1. Thus we  believe that the proliferation of specialist visits in 
Miami is central to the story of why these communities differ so much. 
It is important to emphasize that the differences in indicators shown 
above largely reflect a different approach to the treatment of the chroni- 
cally ill. For some surgical procedures, such as knee replacements and 
back surgery, rates of surgery are actually lower in Miami. 
5.3  How to Interpret Population-Based Differences in Utilization 
It is important to note that the mere existence of geographical  variations 
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One interpretation of variations across areas (theory 1) is they are simply 
the consequences of underlying differences in illness rates or in patient 
preferences for treatment. In this view, variations in surgical treatment for 
enlarged prostates are the consequence in part of mismeasurement; health 
care researchers are simply misled by geographic variations because they 
are unable to control for confounding factors. And what variation remains 
reflects geographical differences in preferences. 
The second interpretation (theory 2) is that different hospitals and health 
care systems have very different protocols and standards for conducting 
surgery and treating illness. In some regions, many more men with enlarged 
prostates will end up having surgery or many more seriously ill patients 
will be treated in the ICU than their counterparts-with  equivalent pref- 
erences and health status-living  elsewhere. In this view, “location is des- 
tiny,” or in the language of econometrics, location is an instrument. 
Theory 1 and theory 2 have very different implications. In theory 1, the 
health care system is productively and allocatively efficient, at least in the 
sense that all American citizens are receiving treatment consistent with 
their preferences, and according to a well-established body of scientific 
evidence and knowledge. Not every hospital will be hugging the produc- 
tively efficient production “envelope,” of course, because of economies of 
scale and volume in the treatment of common diseases (e.g.,  McClellan 
and Staiger, chap. 3 in this volume). But the important policy issues are 
not whether the intensity of services in a community such as Miami is 
much different from that in Minneapolis, but instead whether these re- 
gions (together with other regions in the United States) lead to marginal 
benefits that exceed marginal costs at the national level. Not surprisingly, 
then,  an important policy debate under  theory  1 is whether rationing 
health care on a national level is the appropriate policy to contain poten- 
tial overproduction in medical technology and services.6 
According to theory 2, it is difficult to address national priorities in 
health care spending if  in fact different communities are following such 
widely different treatment  patterns. Instead, the immediate question is, 
Which community’s rate is right? Theory 2 thus points to exploiting empir- 
ically the natural experiments afforded by  the geographic variation phe- 
nomenon by measuring the correlation between inputs of resources and 
outputs of health. As we  discuss below, the implications of theory 2 are 
not simply about allocative efficiency (Which rate is right?) but productive 
efficiency broadly defined (Are some rates always wrong?). 
In figure 5.5 (upper panel), we  consider one way  to characterize these 
differences, where we summarize the intensity of care, Z,  on the horizontal 
6. For a discussion of global budget caps, see Aaron (1992). A uniform percentage de- 
crease in health care costs will have a much different impact than setting a fixed per capita 
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Fig. 5.5  A diagrammatic representation of efficiency in health care 
Note:  In the upper panel, the trade-off between the (dollar) intensity of inputs into health 
care is contrasted with community-level expected lifespan. Point D, for example, corresponds 
to the maximal level  of  lifespan given existing medical technology. In the lower panel, a 
trade-off is shown between lifespan and quality of life. 
axis (measured in dollars) and life-year extension on the vertical axis. Ac- 
cording to theory 1, most hospitals experience similar intensities of ser- 
vice. Not all health care systems are at the production possibility frontier, 
but they do not vary significantly in terms of their intensity of care, and 
any variation that does occur is primarily because of differences in patient 
health or patient preferences. For example, more people may die in hospi- 
tal in Miami, but it is because of a lack of family support (or even available 
nursing home beds) rather than differences in the underlying approach to 178  Jonathan Skinner and John E. Wennberg 
treating sick patients.’ According to this theory, we would describe hospi- 
tals as clustering around one of the points (perhaps point A), or if differ- 
ences in preferences lead to differences in intensity of care, along a contin- 
uum between points A and B. Thus, it makes sense to talk about national 
standards of care, because most hospitals are delivering about the same 
level of intensity. 
According to theory 2, however, there exist wide variations in how a 
given disease is treated, leading to much more variable levels of intensity, 
perhaps ranging from points A to E or beyond, with additional dispersion 
below the production frontier, as represented perhaps by point C. These 
exogenous variations, however, can be used to gain information about the 
nature and shape of  the production  function. By  comparing outcomes 
between high-intensity and low-intensity areas, one can begin to answer 
the question of whether the health care system is described best by clusters 
around point A or at the flat of the curve (point D), where more health 
spending yields nothing in expected lifespan. Or are some regions on the 
wrong side of the curve, point E, where the iatrogenic costs of health inter- 
ventions actually lead to worse outcomes (Fisher et al. 1999)? For hospital 
procedures devoted simply to helping people to survive, such as ICU facil- 
ities, risk-adjusted survival rates are a good measure of outcomes. 
The analysis becomes more complex once one recognizes the essential 
multidimensionality of outcomes. For many procedures, the objective is 
not to maximize lifespan but to improve the overall quality of life. Chemo- 
therapy may have proven benefits in extending survival rates for breast 
cancer, but it can come at a large cost to the patient. Furthermore, there 
is tremendous heterogeneity across patients in the trade-off; in one recent 
study, 12 percent of the sample would undergo standard chemotherapy 
for metastatic breast cancer in return for an expected additional lifespan 
of just one week. By contrast, 28 percent of the sample would not undergo 
standard chemotherapy in return for increased longevity of  18 months 
(McQuellon et al. 1995). Similarly, there is wide variation in preferences 
for  chemotherapy  to treat  advanced-stage non-small  cell  lung  cancer 
(Brundage,  Davidson,  and  Mackillop  1997;  Silvestri,  Pritchard,  and 
Welch  1998; McNeil et al. 1982). For example, in the Silvestri, Pritchard, 
and Welch  study, all respondents had been treated with chemotherapy 
previously for advanced non-small  cell lung cancer. The authors write 
about the patients’ response to a hypothetical case involving the decision 
of whether to elect chemotherapy: “In the setting of severe toxicity, for 
example, 5 (6%) patients would choose chemotherapy for only 1 week of 
additional  survival while 9 (1 1%) others would not choose the therapy 
even when offered 24 months  of additional survival. In both scenarios, 
however, less than half the patients would choose chemotherapy given the 
7. Although Miami does not lack for home health care services on a per capita basis. Efficiency and Medicare Spending in the Last Six Months of Life  179 
‘best guess’ of the actual average benefit-a  3 month difference in median 
survival.” This heterogeneity in preferences makes it very hard to calculate 
a single “quality-adjusted life year” (QALY). For the average person, the 
loss in functioning and pain is not worth the extra life years; thus, the 
QALY  associated with chemotherapy would probably be negative. But 
clearly, the average QALY  is relevant only for the average person. For 
some people, the QALY associated with chemotherapy is positive; for oth- 
ers, clearly negative. Thus the upper panel of figure 5.5 is not an adequate 
representation of the types of trade-offs facing individual patients. 
The lower panel in figure 5.5 demonstrates the problem of treatment 
choice when preferences are heterogeneous. For simplicity, we  consider 
just the trade-off between lifespan and a generic quality of life measure X, 
shown on the horizontal axis. Thus we are implicitly considering a three- 
good utility function that depends on nonmedical consumption Y -  2, 
where Y is income and 2 (as before) is health care resources, lifespan L, 
and quality of life X. Medical technology provides a trade-off between X 
and L; the opportunity set MM’ is shown for a given level of Z equal to 
Z,  . This represents the possible trade-offs between lifespan and quality of 
life given the current state of  medical technology. (A  similar trade-off 
curve exists for lower or higher levels of Z,  one hopes that more 2 yields 
a trade-off curve to the northeast of  MM’.)  In this case, the point C, 
which appears to be productively inefficient in the upper panel, is actually 
preferred by  some patients, shown by  the  (Y  preference ordering, while 
point B is preferred by a different group of patients with preference order- 
ings p. This is why we cannot simply “quality adjust” those life years; the 
different groups (Y and p disagree over the relative weights placed on life- 
span extension versus quality of life. 
The problem becomes more complicated once one accounts for a third 
class of medical procedures that are unlikely to have much impact on life 
expectancy but that will  have a larger effect on different aspects of the 
quality of life. For example, it is unlikely that surgical treatment for an 
enlarged prostate will  have a large impact on expected lifespan, but it 
might be expected to affect symptoms (positively) and sexual functioning 
or incontinence (adversely). Thus, the decision to choose surgical treat- 
ment of enlarged prostates is taken along the flat of  the survival curve 
(point D), where increased spending will yield no benefit in terms of life- 
span but will affect different dimensions of one’s quality of life, X. 
There are two points here. The first is that “best practice” medical care 
does not guarantee allocative efficiency.  There is often a wide range of 
treatments available for a given problem, and which treatment is chosen 
should depend on the preferences of the individual patient (i.e., whether 
he or she is an [Y  or p type). If an [Y  type receives treatment option B 
(perhaps because the alternative, C,  was not offered or was downplayed 
by  the physician), then allocative inefficiency would result. And second, 180  Jonathan Skinner and John E. Wennberg 
it seems unlikely that preferences among the various choices could vary 
systematically across regions in a way to generate such large differences in 
treatment patterns, particularly if the regions are (on average) in the vicin- 
ity of point D. Of course, without further research on actual preferences 
in the two regions, we  cannot prove that preferences do not differ to the 
degree suggested by treatment variation, but the evidence (discussed be- 
low) suggests that, if anything, individuals prefer the less-intensive options 
when given the choice.8 
5.4  Do Health Differences Explain Variation 
in End-of-Life Expenditures? 
We  return  to asking whether  theory  1 might  explain  the  dramatic 
differences in health care spending in the last six months of life. This ques- 
tion is best seen as part of the very large and sometimes contentious de- 
bate over “small area variations.” It is well established that differences in 
per capita medical utilization across the United States and other countries 
exists. Typically, researchers include as many “supply-” and “demand-” 
related measures as can be mustered, but there is still a large residual that 
remains. The battle is over the residual: Does it represent exogenous dif- 
ferences in practice patterns (theory 2), or does it represent preference or 
health-related factors that are simply not measured by the researcher (the- 
ory l)? Without delving into details, we simply note that most research is 
unable to explain the variations using conventional measures of health 
needs (e.g., Wennberg and Fowler 1977; Henke and Epstein 1991; Wenn- 
berg and Cooper 1997; Fisher et al. 1994; Wennberg et al. 1989; Gruber 
and  Owings  1996;  Skinner and Fisher  1997; although  see Green and 
Becker 1  994).9  Thus, under theory 1, regional variation is explained more 
by  tastes (or unmeasured health needs), perhaps reflected in the decision 
of individuals to initiate contact with physicians (e.g., Escarce 1993; Fol- 
land and Stano 1989). The issue of whether to initiate contact with phy- 
sicians, however, is not likely  to be as important among this sample of 
Medicare enrollees in the last six months  of life. Instead, ‘the observed 
differences most likely reflect the intensity of care. 
Still, it may be the case that the intensity of medical spending in the last 
8.  A final issue is whether people choosing between more- and less-intensive treatment on 
the basis of quality of life, as in the prostate example above, should face copayments for the 
more-intensive treatment. If, in fact, survival rates are not affected by the decision to treat 
enlarged prostates surgically, then might not patients be required to face some fraction of 
the extra resource cost? 
9. There is also a literature suggesting that small area variations can be explained simply 
by random variation in averages of regions with small sample sizes (Diehr et al. 1990). How- 
ever, the research using often  100 percent samples of Medicare data (e.g., Wennberg and 
Cooper 1997) shows that the regional variation is not due to small sample problems. Efficiency and Medicare Spending in the Last Six Months of Life  181 
Table 5.1  Regression Explaining Medicare Part A Reimbursements in the Last 
Six Months of Life, by Hospital Referral Region 
Regression Excluding  Regression Including 
Health Resource Variables  Health Resource Variables 
Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient  t-Statistic 









Family practice MD 
Constant 
-170.8  2.9  -93.0 
53.9  0.6  83.4 
770.2  5.1  341.9 
1,185.4  4.1  -23.9 
















Note:  The dependent variable is the price-adjusted average Medicare reimbursements per 
person in their last six months of life. In the first regression, R2  = 0.18; in the second RZ  = 
0.54. Each observation corresponds to a hospital referral region (HRR), of which there are 
306. All regressions are weighted by  the number of Medicare enrollees in the HRR. All of 
these variables (except the percent not-for-profit) have been adjusted for age, sex, and race 
differences; thus, we do not include these variables into the regression. 
six months of life is the consequence of patients in some regions dying of 
diseases requiring more costly palliative care. Thus, we would like to test 
the hypothesis of whether end-of-life expenditures are related to the mix 
of diseases in the hospital referral region (HRR). To do this, we  regress 
the HRR-level measures of  average inpatient  spending in  the last six 
months of life as a function of Medicare hospital admissions in 1994-95 
for a set of common diseases that are reasonable measures of underlying 
community health levels: AMI, stroke, gastrointestinal (GI) bleeding, hip 
fractures, and lung and colon cancer (see Wennberg and Cooper 1997 for 
details). All regressions were weighted by the Medicare population in each 
of the 306 HRRs. 
Table 5.1 displays coefficients from this first regression correlating just 
health indicators with spending near the end of life. There are generally 
significant effects, and the adjusted R2  is 0.18. The coefficient on AMI, for 
example, is negative; this suggests that people with AM1 are more likely 
to die quicker, and at lower cost, than people with other diseases such as 
lung or colon cancer.'O While these diseases account for a large fraction of 
overall mortality, they explain only a small fraction of  the variance in 
spending near the end of life. 
10. We  have included both types of  cancer in  one category because of relatively small 
sample sizes, particularly in later regressions. 182  Jonathan Skinner and John E. Wennberg 
A more general regression model is  also presented in table 5.1 that 
includes  resource  levels:  hospital  beds  per  thousand,  specialist MDs 
per 100,000, primary care MDs per 100,000, and family practitioners per 
100,000. The adjusted R2 rises to 0.54, and the age-sex-race-adjusted bed 
capacity is highly significant. The impact of primary care physicians on 
Medicare end-of-life spending is not significant (and is, in fact, negative), 
although the effect of family practitioners-holding  constant the number 
of overall primary care physicians-is  positive with a modest coefficient. 
However, the impact of  specialists is of  the greatest magnitude and sig- 
nificance. One could argue, of course, that in the long term, the supply of 
physicians in Miami and Minneapolis is not random; perhaps physicians 
(or specialists) are attracted to Miami because of  the heavy volume of 
practice. The point remains that the characteristics of  the regions that 
should matter most under theory 1 for end-of-life spending-disease  bur- 
dens-explain  less than 7 percent of the overall difference between Miami 
($14,212) and Minneapolis ($7,246). In sum, we find it plausible to adopt, 
as a working hypothesis, that Medicare spending in the last six months of 
life contains a strong degree of exogeneity across regions.lI 
5.5  Does the Higher Spending Lead to Better Outcomes? 
Even if there are real differences in how people get treated among areas, 
it still may be the case that people in regions with high levels of  health 
care do better; thus, the extra expenditures in Miami could be justified by 
the improved health status of its population.12 
We address this question in two ways, both using data from the entire 
United States. First, we consider whether differences in end-of-life spend- 
ing have an impact on the overall age-sex-race-adjusted mortality rates in 
the United States. Using the statistical methods developed in Fisher et al. 
(1  999), we  perform a logistic regression on life expectancy for a 20 percent 
sample of the Medicare population (more than 5 million individuals),  con- 
trolling for a wide battery of possible confounding factors such as levels 
of disability, poverty rates, and underlying levels of the five types of dis- 
eases noted above. Table 5.2 provides estimates of the coefficient of inter- 
est-the  partial impact of spending in the last six months of life on mor- 
11. Given that these two cities were chosen on the basis of their extreme differences in 
treatment patterns, it might be expected that they would exhibit the greatest deviation from 
the norm. The point holds, however,  for other regions also. Note also that our claim to 
exogeneity with respect to spending patterns on patients near death does not require that 
one accept a “supplier-induced demand” view of the health care system, only that variations 
in medical spending on patients near death is not simply the consequence of health differ- 
ences. 
12. Thus our approach is similar to those comparing intensity of care and outcomes in 
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Table 5.2  Logistic Regression of Mortality in the Medicare Population 
Variable 
95% Lower  95% Upper 
Odds Ratio  Boundary  Boundary  Significance 
Spending in last 6 months  1.001  0.999  1.003  0.408 
ICU days in last 6 months  1.008  1.003  1.014  0.002 
Note: In the table above, the dependent variable is whether the individual lived or died in the 
benchmark year of 1990. The logistics odds ratio is shown for price-adjusted expenditures in 
the last six months of life, or for the average number of days spent in an ICU in the last six 
months of life. These variables (for 1994-95)  are calculated for each hospital service area, 
of which there are 3,436 in the United States. Thus, the level of analysis is at a finer level of 
geography than for the standard hospital referral region used in most of the other statistical 
analyses. There are more than  5 million observations in the regression. This regression is 
adopted from Fisher et al. (1999). Covariates include age-sex-race-specific  cells, and from 
the census: median family income (for blacks and whites separately) in the population over 
65, percent of  population 65+ below the poverty level, education (less than grade 12, high 
school graduates, and college graduates), percent in rural areas, percent in urbanized areas, 
percent with work disabilities, self-care limitations, and mobility limitations (all 65 +). 
tality-along  with a description of the additional variables; also see the 
appendix for a full set of regression results. 
Briefly,  there appears to be little correlation between the intensity of 
care near the end of life and mortality rates, whether intensity is measured 
by  spending, days in  the hospital,  or ICU days near the end of  life. If 
anything, there is a slight positive (and highly significant) correlation be- 
tween ICU days and mortality  rates; an increase of  1.0 in the average 
number of ICU days in the last six months of life is predicted to increase 
mortality rates by 0.8 percent. 
One objection to this analysis is that there may  be reverse causation; 
sicker regions would tend to have higher spending near the end of life, and 
hence generate a spurious correlation between the two variables (possibly 
masking the true negative correlation). This objection, however, carries 
less weight given that we  are restricting our measure of spending to the 
universe of people near death. Sicker communities might well spend more 
per Medicare enrollee and experience a higher mortality rate, but it is not 
clear that sicker communities would spend more per person for the set of 
people who die. Still, it is useful to consider this question using a different 
approach that focuses on disease-specific mortality rates. 
We  selected a 5 percent sample of Medicare enrollees who were diag- 
nosed with diseases that almost surely caused admission to the hospital- 
AMI, stroke, GI bleeding, hip fractures, and lunglcolon cancer-for  the 
two-year period  1992-93.  Conditional on having an AM1 or stroke, one 
might expect that the underlying health status, and survival probabilities 
should be similar across areas, thus potentially correcting for the reverse 
causality problem. As  our marker for the intensity of health care in the 184  Jonathan Skinner and John E. Wennberg 
Table 5.3  Logistic Regressions of Mortality in the Medicare Population for Five 
Specific Health Conditions 
Mortality Variable 
6-month (full sample) 
6-month (full sample? 
90-day (full sample) 
6-month (AMI) 
6-month (stroke) 
6-month (hip fracture) 









































Note: The dependent variable is whether the individual lived or died within the 6-month (or 
90-day) period, conditional on having been admitted to hospital for one of the five initiating 
conditions during the years 1992-93.  The logistics odds ratio is shown for price-adjusted 
expenditures in the last six months of life (in units of $1,000) by  HRR or (as in row 2) the 
average number of ICU days by HRR, again in the last six months of life. The overall sample 
size is 53,564. Average 6-month mortality  rates are 22.6 percent; average 90-day rates are 
18.7 percent. 
'This logistics odds ratio is shown for the average number of ICU days in the last six months, 
by  HRR. 
region (or HRR), we  also include the average Medicare spending and av- 
erage number of ICU days for each HRR during the last six months of 
life (for all residents in 1994-95).13 
We also include as independent variables controls for age, sex, and race; 
details of the logistic analysis are reported in table 5.3, with the full results 
from one regression shown in the appendix. Once again, there does not 
appear to be any positive impact on mortality of the region-level intensity 
of care for enrollees in the last six months of life (either measured in dollar 
terms or in ICU days). 
One might object to this analysis because end-of-life spending is prob- 
ably accounted for largely by  treatment for chronic diseases, not for sud- 
den medical emergencies such as AM1 and stroke; thus, our indicator 
may not summarize well how a given AM1 or stroke would be treated. An- 
other way to approach this problem is to calculate the diseuse-specific lev- 
els of health care spending by HRR. We do this by first regressing Medi- 
care reimbursements, at the individual level, on age, sex, race, and illness 
dummy variables. This regression reflects possible differences in Medicare 
spending as the consequence of demographic or illness variation across 
regions. We  then average the residuals in each region (after controlling 
for these demographic and illness factors); these HRR-level constructed 
13. While these data are from the period  1992-93  and the end of life data are from the 
period  1994-95,  the temporal mismatch is not likely to bias our results substantially, given 
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residuals were highly correlated with HRR-level spending in the last six 
months of life.I4 We  then used the HRR-level residuals in a second-stage 
regression seeking to explain mortality rates, with insignificant results (re- 
gressions not reported). We  regard these results as preliminary, however, 
given the larger sample sizes necessary for statistical power. 
Of course, it could be that our measure of outcome, survival, does not 
adequately reflect the true underlying quality of life enjoyed by patients in 
Miami over those in Minneapolis. While we  have no direct evidence on 
quality-of-life outcomes in the two regions, we  can turn to more general 
evidence from research on whether patients in fact prefer these more inten- 
sive forms of treatment. 
5.6  Do Patients Prefer More Intensive Levels of Health Care? 
The Case of Surgery 
In this section, we  return to the issue of preferences in health care and 
to the notion that specific surgical procedures could improve the quality 
of life even if survival rates are not improved (or worsened). Thus, we  seek 
to address whether, in fact, patients prefer the more intensive patterns of 
health care. In contrast to treatment intensity during the last six months 
of  life, the goal of surgery is often to increase the quality of life, not the 
length of life. In fact, the risks inherent in surgery often mean that im- 
provements in the quality of life come at the cost of a small increase in the 
chance of early death. But length of life versus quality of life is not the 
only trade-off. For example, most patients who undergo surgery for an 
enlarged prostate gland experience a change in sexual function (retrograde 
ejaculation), and there is a risk of incontinence and impotence. Men with 
enlarged prostates thus face a dilemma: Although  surgery provides the 
best option for reducing symptoms, it involves trade-offs with tangible 
risks. Men and women with stable angina benefit more in terms of imme- 
diate reduction in symptoms by undergoing coronary artery revasculari- 
zation. But again, there are trade-offs. For example, among the Medicare 
population, mortality from bypass surgery is about 2 percent; a substan- 
tial number of those who  undergo this operation  experience a loss in 
short-term memory and other impairments of cognition. 
Research shows that men, when fully informed about the options and 
their possible consequences, differ substantially in their preferences for 
surgery. For the case of enlarged prostates, the objective of the surgery is 
to improve the symptoms, including difficulty or strain in urination.  In 
one study, a sample of men with prostate symptoms was presented with 
14. In other words, there is a strong HRR-level correlation between the intensity of spend- 
ing in the last  six months of  life and the intensity of  spending more generally for these 
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Table 5.4  Factors Predicting Choice of Surgery for Enlarged Prostate Gland 
95% Confidence 
Variable  Odds Ratio  Interval 
Symptom score 
Mild  0.09  0.01, 0.72 
Moderate 
Severe  1.48  0.6, 3.6 
Rating of  symptoms 
Positive/mixed 
Negative  7.0  2.9, 16.6 
Rating of impotence 
Positivdmixed 
Negative  0.20  0.08, 0.48 
~~~~~  ~~ 
Source; Barry et al. (1995). 
Note; N = 347; 32 of  these men underwent a prostatectomy. The table presents the results 
of a logistic regression model to predict choice of surgery. Symptoms are whether the patient 
experiences difficulty with urinating. Although in the univariate model patients with severe 
symptoms were 2.4 times more likely to choose surgery than those who were moderately 
symptomatic, only 21 percent of those with severe symptoms actually choose surgery. In the 
multivariate model, the odds ratio dropped to 1.48 and was no longer significant. By  con- 
trast, the ratings patients gave to their symptoms (ic, how much they were bothered  by 
them) and concern about impotence were strong predictors of choice. 
information about the risks and benefits of surgery, and then asked about 
their own preferences (Barry et al. 1995); a summary of results from a 
logistic regression is shown in table 5.4. The partial effect of severe (rather 
than moderate) symptoms is to raise the chance of choosing surgery (odds 
ratio of 1.48, or an increase of 48 percent), but the results are not signif- 
icant.I5 By  contrast,  two  much  better  (and  significant)  predictors  of 
whether the patient chooses surgery were (1) if the given symptoms both- 
ered the patient (odds ratio of 7.0) and (2) the degree of concern about 
the chance of impotence (odds ratio of 0.2). In other words, the most 
important predictors of whether the men chose surgery was less the sever- 
ity of the symptoms, and more the degree to which the symptoms bothered 
the patient and their concerns about the possibility of impotence. Thus, 
geographical regions have the potential  for significant allocative ineffi- 
ciency, even if their average rates are “right.” The necessary condition for 
efficiency is that the patients desiring surgery are the ones that get it and 
the patients who don’t want surgery don’t get it. 
Two experiments designed to study the effects of shared decision mak- 
ing on the rates of surgery provide an insight into the extent that surgery 
may be misallocated in the United States. The first, conducted in two staff 
model HMOs, implemented a change in the way  clinical decisions were 
15. A mild symptom score reduced (significantly) the odds of having surgery. However, 
mildly symptomatic men generally do worse after surgery and probably should not be offered 
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made for prostate surgery. After viewing an interactive video that informed 
patients about the risks and benefits of alternative treatment, patients were 
encouraged to choose the treatment they would prefer. Surgery rates were 
measured before and after the video was introduced, and also with refer- 
ence to a control population. In each HMO, rates dropped about 40 per- 
cent, suggesting that the amount of surgery formally “prescribed” by  the 
HMO exceeded the amount that informed patients wanted (Wagner et al. 
1995). The resulting demand for prostate surgery is shown in figure 5.6; 
interestingly, this benchmark was less than virtually every region in  the 
United States. Similarly, a randomized trial of a shared decision making 
program for treatment  of  coronary artery  disease suggests that patient 
demand for revascularization (at least in Canada) may be lower than the 
rate of  revascularization in nearly every HRR in the United States; see 
figure 5.6 (Morgan et al. 1997). 
These findings suggest a point that should be easily absorbed by econo- 
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Fig. 5.6  Actual and desired rates of surgery for enlarged prostate and angina 
Source: Wagner et al. (1995); Morgan et al. (1997). 
Note: The distribution of rates in the left-hand panel is for surgery for enlarged prostate 
gland (benign prostatic hyperplasia [BPH]) among Medicare enrollees living in the nation’s 
306 hospital referral regions. The distribution in the right-hand panel is for coronary artery 
revascularization. A study of the effects of involving patients directly in their choice of sur- 
gery was conducted among patients with enlarged prostates in two staff model HMOs and 
among patients with angina in Toronto, Canada. In the prostate study, when patients were 
fully informed about the risk and benefits of alternative treatments and encouraged to partic- 
ipate actively in the choice of treatment, the population-based rate of surgery dropped 40 
percent compared to controls. In the Ontario study, the rate dropped about 24 percent, even 
though the baseline rate in Ontario was substantially less than  any rate observed in the 
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mists. If patients are both less enthusiastic about surgery than the national 
averages would suggest, and show heterogeneity in their underlying prefer- 
ences toward outcomes from surgery, there is a potential Pareto improve- 
ment by  allowing them to make their own choice, even if  the choice is 
ultimately to defer to the physician’s choice. In the cases considered above, 
society gains: Patient welfare is improved, and expenditures on health care 
are reduced. 
5.7  Discussion and Conclusion 
Regions across the United States appear to have adopted much different 
strategies for treating Medicare patients. In this paper, we  compare ex- 
penditures and ICU utilization across these hospital referral regions for 
elderly people in their last six months. We  choose people in the last six 
months of life because they are all quite sick, and thus we  can partially 
control for geographical differences in the underlying levels of disease. 
Medicare expenditures in the last six months of life are twice as high in 
Miami as in Minneapolis, and the average number of specialist visits is 
nearly five times higher. We have argued that these differences are unlikely 
to be explained simply on the basis of differences in health status or even 
preferences. In sum, we find little support for our theory 1 (that variation 
in health care treatment  simply reflects differences in  preferences or in 
underlying health status) and much more support for the notion that the 
variation in health status is to some extent exogenous (theory 2). 
Variation in  Medicare spending alone does not necessarily imply in- 
efficiency in the distribution of health care. After all, sick people in regions 
with more intensive treatment patterns may survive longer, thus (possibly) 
justifying the extra expenses. However, using two much larger samples of 
individuals-one  a 20  percent sample of all Medicare enrollees and the 
other a 5 percent sample of Medicare patients hospitalized  with AMI, 
stroke, GI bleeding, and cancer-we  find no evidence that higher levels of 
spending translate into extended survival. But it may still be the case that 
people  in  the high-intensity  areas prefer the more intensive treatment. 
And while we do not know conclusively that people in such regions would 
prefer more intensive health care, we do know that patients living in other 
areas, if provided with information to make their own choices, generally 
prefer less, not more, intensive health care. Thus, we  conjecture that on 
the basis of economic efficiency, Miami may fall short of Minneapolis. 
Our results may appear inconsistent with recent evidence documenting 
the striking secular gains in survival rates following heart attacks (e.g., 
Cutler et al. 1996).16  However, our test for the effectiveness of health care 
relates solely to regional differences in the intensity of care in a given year, 
and hence for a given body of medical knowledge. 
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One question we  are not yet able to answer is, Why do physicians and 
hospitals in Miami adopt such an intensive strategy for health care, and 
in Minneapolis, a much less intensive approach? One reason could be the 
sheer amount of resources in Miami: more hospital beds per thousand (3.2 
versus 2.6) and more specialists (146 per 100,000 versus 100).17  Another 
explanation could be the much higher ratio of for-profit hospital beds in 
Miami: 56 percent versus less than 2 percent in Minneapolis. But there is 
still a substantial residual left unexplained even after accounting for sup- 
ply  factors. And even these “causal” factors are suspect, since for-profit 
hospital chains or physicians may be most likely to locate where practice 
styles are most aggressive.I8 
Perhaps the for-profit hospitals in Miami exerted a larger impact on the 
not-for-profits because of more dense markets in Miami causing the not- 
for-profits to imitate the behavior of the for-profits, in the sense of Cutler 
and Horwitz (chap. 2 in this volume). Alternatively, the key to explaining 
why  Miami is so different could be in the structure of physician groups 
rather than the h0spita1s.l~  The interaction between patient demand and 
physician behavior is also important in understanding the practice of med- 
icine in Miami; perhaps elderly patients come to expect numerous refer- 
rals as the norm, and would suspect physicians who do not refer them to 
other physicians. 
The differences in practice patterns between these two cities (and across 
the United States more generally) appear to be real, but they are somewhat 
resistant to an entirely economic structural explanation. Ultimately, some 
part of the story may be the (random) emergence of small groups of entre- 
preneurial physicians who set the practice style for the entire area. A re- 
cent Wall Street Journal article, for example, identified a single aggressive 
cardiology physicians group as the reason for why Lubbock, Texas, had one 
of the highest per capita rates of angioplasty in the country (Anders 1996).20 
Whether regional differences in  Medicare utilization can ultimately  be 
explained in a structural model of medical practice, or whether these re- 
gional differences are the outcome of a “path-dependent” process origi- 
nating with a few entrepreneurial physicians, is a topic for future research. 
17. There are also more primary care physicians in Miami (83 versus 68 per  lOO,OOO), 
although as noted above, primary care physicians are not correlated with Medicare spending 
in the last six months of life. 
18. Even if  physician supply, for example, is increased in Miami because of the more 
intensive practice style, we can still view the resulting treatment intensity as exogenous from 
the point of view of a production function. 
19. One conference participant suggested that fraud could also play a part in the high 
number of  physician visits in Miami. Ironically, were the difference attributed to fraud, the 
efficiency considerations would be much more benign. Fraud is simply transfers from the 
government to physicians without any real resource cost except the effort of  signing forms 
and filing them. There is  a real resource cost, the alternative activities of the physician, if the 
doctor is actually visiting the patient. 
20. The group expanded by advertising in the New England Journal of Medicine for cardiol- 
ogists seeking potential incomes in excess of $1 million. Appendix 
Table 5A.l  Logit Regression Explaining Mortality (from AU  Causes) in the Medicare Population 
Coefficient 
(95% Confidence Interval) 






Percent with income $15,000-$20,000 
Percent with income > $20,000 
Percent in poverty 
Percent moved 
Percent rural 
Percent in city 
($ thousands per capita) 
.0015 








(-,043,  ,018) 
-.0364 
(- .098, ,026) 
-  .0240 
(-,035,  -.012) 
-.0265 
(-,042,  -.011) 
-  .0041 
(-,011,  ,003) 
-.0010 
(- .006, ,004) 
-.002 




(95% Confidence Interval) 
Percent in nursing home 
Percent Hispanic 
Percent single 
Percent high school dropout 
Percent high school graduate 
Medicare HMO percentage 
Percent employed (> age 16) 
Percent with working disability 
Percent with self-care limitation 
Percent with mobility limitation 
Per capita MDs 150-200 per 














(.001,  .002) 
,0531 
(.048,  .059) 
,0352 
(.027, .044) 
-  .OO83 






(-,009,  ,017) 
Note: The reported coefficients are for the logit regression index and are not odds ratios. These results control for age-sex-race dummy variables (it., a 
dummy variable for a nonblack female age 70-74)  and regional dummy variables (coefficients not reported). The number of  age-sex-race-zip-code cells 
is 311.146. Table 5A.2  Logit Regression Explaining Mortality for a Cohort in the Medicare Population with Specific Diseases 
Coefficient 
(95% Confidence Interval) 
Medicare spending in the last 6 months of life  .0998 
(0.986, 1.010) 








($ thousands per capita) 
CVA (stroke)/1,000  2.323 
GI bleedindl  ,000  1.077 
Lung and colon cancerl1,OOO  1.014 
For-profit ratio  1.094 
Male age 65-69  0.964 
Male age 70-74  1.311 
Coefficient 
(95% Confidence Interval) 
Male age 75-79  1.802 










Male age 85-90  3.533 
Male age 90+  6.039 
Female age 70-74  1.176 
Female age 75-79  1.483 
Female age 80-84  1.922 
Female age 85-89  2.576 
Female age 90+  3.829 192  Jonathan Skinner and John E. Wennberg 
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